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1. Introduction
While, undoubtedly, the entrepreneur plays a vital role in the economy of any free-enterprise society
and is a key factor of economic growth, there is no universally agreed-upon theoretical approach to
the notion of entrepreneurship and to the idea of innovation. Moreover, most theoretical models fail
to capture the role of the entrepreneur adequately (see Baumol [4] or Bianchi and Henrekson [5] for
a discussion). This has been a major hurdle in the theory of entrepreneurship – especially within
neoclassical economic theory – and it is all the more discomforting, given the importance attributed
to the entrepreneur since the early works of Knight [36] and Schumpeter [53]. Arguably, the most
celebrated neoclassical models of entrepreneurship are the ones of Lucas [37] and Kihlstrom and
Laffont [34]. For Lucas [37], the entrepreneur is the manager of a firm, whose role is that of planning
the optimal use of inputs such as labor and capital in order to maximize output. In this model, one of
the inputs of the production function is the managerial talent, and it is assumed that while all agents
have equal productivity, agents do differ with respect to their managerial talent. Entrepreneurs
are then the agents with a managerial talent that exceeds a certain (endogenously determined)
benchmark. Uncertainty and risk-atittude play no role in this deterministic model. Kihlstrom and
Laffont [34] consider a general equilibrium model of the firm under uncertainty, in which agents are
Expected-Utility maximizers. The model of Kihlstrom and Laffont [34] is essentially an occupational
choice model where, at the equilibrium, the degree of risk aversion of individual agents determines
their becoming an entrepreneur who operates a risky firm and receives an uncertain profit, or a paid
employee receiving a risk-free wage. Entrepreneurs are characterized by their lower degree of risk
aversion, whereas paid employees have a higher degree of risk aversion. However, the fundamental
distinction between risk and Knightian uncertainty as well as the idea of innovation are absent from
this model.
In the Austrian tradition, the entrepreneur is at the forefront of the reflection on the nature
of economic markets and on the elusive idea of equilibrium. Austrian economics sees the market
equilibrium as a process, a systematic equilibration process, and the entrepreneur is the fundamental
driving force behind this process. Moreover, Austrian theory has long recognized the fundamental role
of Knightian uncertainty in economic markets and its intertwining with the notion of entrepreneurship
itself (see for instance Kirzner [35]). In Schumpeter’s [53] view, entrepreneurship goes hand in
hand with the very idea of innovation and is at the core of economic change. The entrepreneur
constantly challenges the status quo through a process of “creative destruction” that drives economic
development, and he acts in a context of Knightian uncertainty (Ambiguity).
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on innovation and entrepreneurship by formalizing
a definition of innovation and of the entrepreneur in the spirit of Schumpeter [53], and by formally
examining how the idea of Ambiguity surrounds the actions of the entrepreneur. Our interest in this
problem is rooted in a broad project [2, 3, 6, 28, 44, 45] which aims at answering the following ques-
tions: How do capitalist systems generate their dynamism? Why is a capitalist economy inherently
different from a centrally planned one? Our research has been inspired by the fundamental belief
that in order to study these issues, we must study the mechanisms of entrepreneurship and innovation
in capitalist economies: the role of entrepreneurs in seeing commercial possibilities for developing
and adopting products that exploit new technologies; the role of entrepreneurs in conceiving and
developing new products and methods; the role of financiers in identifying entrepreneurs to back and
to advise; and the incentives and disincentives for entrepreneurship inside established corporations.
The study of entrepreneurial economies imposes some new challenges, and is radically different
form the classical approach. In this paper, we focus on the microfoundations of entrepreneurial
economies: we give a formal definition of innovation, of entrepreneur and of a financier, and we study
the interaction of entrepreneurs and financiers as micro actors. We refer the interested reader to [2]
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for a preliminary inquiry into the properties of entrepreneurial economies, including considerations
about equilibria and welfare. In this paper, we propose a model of entrepreneurship and innovation
in which the entrepreneur is an innovator, and the introduction of an innovation into an economy by
an entrepreneur generates Knightian uncertainty. We argue that at the core of this entrepreneurial
economy lies a problem of contracting between an entrepreneur and a financier. It is a contracting
problem involving not only differences in beliefs, but also Ambiguity. We call this problem a problem
of contracting for innovation, and a large part of this paper focuses on studying this problem of
contracting for innovation between an entrepreneur and a financier. Two strands of literature merge
in our work: the literature on entrepreneurship and innovation and the literature on contracting
under Ambiguity. We contribute to the former by building a theoretical framework where we can
answer questions such as What does “innovation” mean? Are “entrepreneur” and “financier” just
two labels, or is there something substantial behind these denominations? Why does “contracting for
innovation” differ from other contracting problems? We contribute to the literature on contracting
under Ambiguity by studying and solving a novel problem of contracting under Ambiguity. We refer
the reader to Section 8 for a thorough discussion of our contributions in relation to the existing
literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present our ideas on entrepreneurship
and innovation in Sections 2 and 3. Section 2 deserves special mention since it contains the formal
definition of Innovation that we introduce in this paper. The ideas elaborated in these sections lead
to the formulation of a certain contracting problem in Section 4. In Section 5, we state our theorem
on the existence and monotonicity (truth-telling) of an optimal “innovation contract”. In Section
6, for the case of globally Ambiguity-seeking financiers, we present additional results which allow
for an easier determination of the optimal innovation contract. We sharpen these results further
in Section 7 where we fully characterize the optimal innovation contract in explicit form, but we
do so at the cost of introducing additional assumptions. We believe, nonetheless, that this result
may be still useful in more relaxed settings, for instance by providing the basis for a computational
procedure. As anticipated, we conclude in Section 8 by discussing our contributions in the context
of the existing literature. A number of Appendices containing some background material as well as
the proofs omitted from the main text complete the exposition.
2. Innovation
2.1. Objective States vs Subjective States. When dealing with uncertainty, a central concept in
classical theories is that of a state of the world. Following the Bayesian tradition, a state of the world
is a complete specification of all the parameters defining an environment. For instance, a state of the
world for the economy would consist of a specification of temperature, humidity, consumers’ tastes,
technological possibilities, detailed maps of all possible planets, etc. According to this view, the
future is uncertain because it is not known in advance which state will obtain. In principle (but this
is clearly beyond human capabilities), one might come up with the full list of all possible states, and
classical theories postulate that each and every agent would be described by a probability measure
on such a list. While (ex ante) different agents might have different views (i.e., different probability
distributions), the information conveyed by the market eventually leads them to entertain the same
view: at an economy’s equilibrium no two agents are willing to bet against each other about the
resolution of uncertainty. Thus, in classical theories, there is nothing uncontroversial about the way
one deals with uncertainty.
The contrast between this prediction of the theory and what happens in real life is striking. Actual
economic agents usually disagree about the resolution of uncertainty, and even the assumption of a
list of contingencies known to all agents as well as the assumption of each agent having a probability
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distribution over such contingencies seem hardly tenable. It is an old idea, dating back at least
to F. Knight [36], that some – and, perhaps, the most relevant – economic decisions are made in
circumstances where the information available is too coarse to make full sense of the surrounding
environment, where things look too fuzzy for one to have a probability distribution over a set of
relevant contingencies. In such situations, Risk Theory is simply of no use. We fully adhere to this
view.
The concept of a state of the world is central to our theory as well. We depart, however, from
classical theories in that we do not assume the existence of a list of all possible states which is known
to all agents. We do so for several reasons. First, we believe that this assumption is too artificial.
Second, a theory built on such an assumption would not be testable, not even in principle. Third,
and more importantly, we believe that by making such an assumption we would lose sight of the
actual role played by entrepreneurs and financiers in actual economies.
We take a point of view that might be deemed “objective”. We start with the (abstract) notion of
an asset. In its broadest interpretation, an asset is, by definition, something that pays off depending
on the realization of certain contingencies. In other words, in order to define an asset, one must
specify a list of contingencies along with the amount that the asset pays as a function of those
contingencies. At each point in time, the set of assets existing in the economy is observable. Thus, in
principle, the set of contingencies associated with each asset is objectively given. The union, taken
over all the assets, of all these contingencies is then objectively given, in the sense that is it derived
from observables. We call this set the set of publicly known states of the world, and we denote it by
SP . We assume that each and every agent in the economy is aware of all the states contained in SP .
We stress, however, that what is more important is that this set be knowable rather than be known
by every agent. Of course, there is no reason why agents in the economy, individually considered,
should be restricted to holding the same view. In other words, while we assume that each agent is
aware of the set SP of publicly known states of the world, we are also open to the possibility that
each agent might consider states that are not in SP . Formally, we admit that each agent i has a
subjective state space Si of the form Si “ SP Y Ii, where Ii is the list of contingencies in agent i’s
set of states that are not publicly known (i.e., SP X Ii “ ∅). An example might clarify. In the
’50s, IBM was investing in the creation of (big) computers. In our terminology, this means that IBM
had envisioned states of the world where computers would be produced and sold, where hardware
and software for computers would be produced and sold, etc. Since IBM stocks were tradable, these
states would be part of the publicly known states according to our definition. Some time between
the late ’50s and the early ’60s, Doug Englebart envisioned a world where PCs existed and where
software and hardware for PCs would be produced and sold. According to our view, before Doug
Englebart began patenting his ideas, these states existed only in his mind (and maybe in those of
few others); that is, they were part of Doug Englebart’s subjective state space, but they were not
publicly knowable.
We will assume that each agent i is a Bayesian decision maker with respect to his own subjective
state space. That is, agent i with subjective state space Si makes his decisions according to a
probability distribution Pi on Si. In the terminology that we will be using in Section 3 below, this
means that we assume that each agent believes that he has a good understanding of his own state
space. While this assumption could be removed, we believe that it is a good first approximation.
Moreover, we believe that it follows quite naturally from the idea of a subjective state space, as we
define it.
2.2. Innovation and the Entrepreneur. The idea of “innovation” and the way we model it is
central to our theory. Undoubtedly, the ability to “innovate” is one of the most distinguishing features
of capitalist economies. Innovations occur in the form of new consumption goods, new technological
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processes, new institutions, new forms of organizations in trading activities, etc. We abstract from
the differences existing across different types of innovation, and focus on what is common among
them. For us, an innovation is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Innovation). An innovation is a set of states of the world which are not publicly
known along with an asset which pays contingent on those states (and, possibly, on the publicly known
ones).
An example will clarify momentarily. For now, we would like to point out that the word “asset”
in the definition should be interpreted in a broad sense. That is, by asset we mean any activity
capable of generating economic value. An innovation will be denoted by a pair pSj ,Xjq, where j is
the innovator, Sj is his subjective state space and Xj is the asset that pays contingent on states in
Sj. Notice that, as it is encoded in the definition of the subjective state space, pSj,Xjq pays off also
contingent on states in SP .
In order to illustrate the definition, let us imagine an economy where historically only two types
of cakes have been consumed: carrot cakes and coconut cakes. Each year, each individual consumer
might be of one of two types: she either likes carrot cakes (consumers of type 1) or coconut cakes
(consumers of type 2), but not both. The fraction of the population made of consumers of type 1
varies from year to year according to some known stochastic process. In this economy, there are two
productive processes: one for producing carrot cakes and one for coconut cakes. There is a continuum
of tomorrow’s states, where each state corresponds to the fraction of consumers of type 1. These
states are understood by everyone in the economy. That is, SP “ r0, 1s and a point x in r0, 1s means
that the fraction of type 1 consumers is x. Moreover, there is a given probability distribution on r0, 1s,
which is known to everyone in the economy. Now, suppose that an especially creative individual,
whom we call e, comes into the scene and (a) figures out a new productive process that produces
banana cakes; and, (b) believes that each consumer, whether of type 1 or 2, would switch to banana
cakes with probability 1{3 if given the opportunity. What is happening here is that agent e has: (i)
imagined a whole set of new states, those in which consumers might like banana cakes (in fact, the
subjective state space for agent e is two-dimensional, while SP is one-dimensional); (ii) imagined
that a non-negligible probability mass might be allocated to the extra dimension conditional on the
consumers being given the chance to consume banana cakes; and, (iii) figured out a device (the
productive process) that makes the new states capable of generating economic value.
The definition of innovation given above conveys the essential features which identify any innova-
tion: the new states along with the new activity. We believe that one of the virtues of our definition
of innovation is that it makes it clear that the process of innovation is truly associated with the
appearance of new and fundamentally different possibilities: from the viewpoint of the innovator,
both the state space and the space of production possibilities have higher dimensionality1.
Definition 2.2 (Entrepreneur). An agent e who issues an innovation is called an entrepreneur.
Recall that we have assumed that each agent has a probability distribution on his subjective state
space. Thus, an entrepreneur is described by a triple pSe,Xe, Peq, where pSe,Xeq is the innovation
and Pe is his subjective probability on the subjective state space Se.
1Given two sets, A and B, the Cartesian product A ˆ B and the disjoint union A _ B are trivially isomorphic.
Thus, in the definition of subjective state space we could have used products (as we have done in the example) rather
than disjoint unions. In this paper, we have opted for disjoint unions as this greatly simplifies the wording of certain
statements.
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3. Uncertainty and the Classification of Economic Agents
In our story, the innovators are the entrepreneurs. But what happens once an entrepreneur comes
up with an innovation? In the economy above, how would consumers react if they are told that
banana cakes will be available? We follow up here on the idea expressed above that an innovation is
associated to a new scenario, i.e., something that the economy as whole has not yet experienced. It is
then natural to view such a situation as one of Knightian uncertainty (or Ambiguity): the information
available is (except, possibly, for the entrepreneur) too coarse to form a probability distribution on
the relevant contingencies. Notice that Ambiguity enters our model in a rather novel way: its source
is not some device (Nature) outside the economic system; rather, it is some of the economic actors
– the entrepreneurs – who are the primary source of Ambiguity.
Decision theorists have developed several models to deal with this problem, all of which stipulate
that the behavior of agents facing Ambiguity is described not by a single probability but rather by
a set of those (See Gilboa and Marinacci [25] for a comprehensive survey). Formally, the problem
is as follows. Let e be an entrepreneur, and let i be another agent. Agent i is represented by a
pair pSi, Piq, where Si is her subjective state space and Pi a probability on Si. Suppose that i has
never thought of the subjective states of the entrepreneur. Now, suppose that agent i is made aware,
directly or otherwise, of the innovation pSe,Xeq as well as of the probability Pe of the entrepreneur.
What is i going to do? Is she going to believe e and adopt his view (i.e., the probability Pe), or is i
going to form a different opinion? In fact, is i going to form an opinion at all? Clearly, each of these
cases is possible, and there is no real reason to favor one over the other. Thus, we need a way to
model all these possibilities simultaneously. We do so as follows. When agent i becomes aware of the
subjective states of agent e, the set of states for agent i becomes Si Y Se. Thus, agent i’s problem
is that of extending her view from Si to the union Si Y Se as this is necessary for evaluating assets
that pay contingent on Se. We assume that agent i makes this extension by using all the probability
distributions on Si Y Se which are compatible with her original view, that is, all those probabilities
on Si Y Se whose conditional on Si is Pi. The exact way in which agent i will evaluate the assets
defined on Se depends, loosely speaking, on the way all of these probabilities are aggregated and, in
general, different agents would aggregate them in different ways. To put it in a different terminology,
an agent’s evaluation of the assets defined on Se depends on the agent’s attitude toward Ambiguity.
This observation suggests a natural classification of economic agents: in one category we would put
those agents who are going to share, at least partially, the view of at least one entrepreneur, while
in the other we would put those who are not going to do so under any circumstance. The former
have the potential to become business partners of some entrepreneurs, whereas the latter will never
do so. Thus, we will distinguish between consumers and financiers that are defined as follows.
1. Consumers: Their subjective state space coincides with the publicly known set of states.
They are Ambiguity-averse, in the sense that they always evaluate their options according to
the worst probability (i.e., worst case scenario, or Maxmin Expected Utility [26]). Formally,
a consumer c is represented by a pair pSP,Pcq, where Pc is a probability measure on SP .
When facing an innovation pSe,Xeq, c evaluates it by using the functional
C pXeq “ min
PPCc
ż
uc pXeq dP
where Cc is the set of all probabilities on SP Y Se whose conditional on SP is Pc and uc is
the consumer’s utility on outcomes.
Notice that this description easily implies that (i) if there exists a bond in the economy, and (ii) if
there exists a state in Se such that the worth of the innovation is below the bond, then the consumer
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will not buy that innovation at any positive price. Under these circumstances, these agents will never
become business partners of any entrepreneur, which explain why we call them consumers.
2. Financiers: Their subjective state space coincides with the publicly known set of states.
They are less Ambiguity-averse than the consumers. A financier ϕ is represented by a pair
pSP,Pϕq, where Pϕ is a probability measure on SP . When facing an innovation pSe,Xeq, ϕ
evaluates it by using the functional
(3.1) Φ pXeq “ α pXeq min
QPCϕ
ż
uϕ pXeq dQ`
´
1´ αpXeq
¯
max
QPCϕ
ż
uϕ pXeq dQ
where Cϕ is the set of probabilities on SP Y Se whose conditional on SP is Pϕ and uϕ is the
financier’s utility on outcomes. For each asset Xe, the coefficient α pXeq P r0, 1s.
Thus, the functional (3.1) is a combination of aversion toward projects that involve new states
(the min part of the functional) and favor toward the same projects (the max part). Intuitively, the
coefficient αpXeq represents the degree of Ambiguity aversion of the financier (see [21, 22]), and this
degree is allowed to vary with the asset (i.e., the entrepreneurial project) to be evaluated. In fact,
the coefficient α p¨q represents the financier’s view: a high α p¨q means that the financier does not
believe in the project, while a low α p¨q means that the financier shares, for the most part, the view
of the entrepreneur. We suppose that for at least one asset Xe, αpXeq ă 1; that is, there exists at
least a project that, once in existence, the financier would consider worth funding at some positive
price. A special case obtains when the financier’s attitude toward Ambiguity does not depend on the
project to be evaluated. In such a case, projects are evaluated by using the functional
Φ pXeq “ α min
QPCϕ
ż
uϕ pXeq dQ` p1´ αqmax
QPCϕ
ż
uϕ pXeq dQ
where we suppose that α ă 1.
We believe that our categorization captures the essential (functional) distinction between the
concept of a “consumer” and that of a “financier”: a (pure) consumer is someone who rejects the
unknown, and a financier is somebody who is willing to bet on it. The condition in the above
definitions that both the consumer’s and the financier’s state space is SP only means that consumers
and financiers are not entrepreneurs. One might argue that this assumption is natural in the case of
consumers but it is not so in the case of financiers. This is not problematic as a financier’s subjective
state space bigger than SP can be easily accommodated in our framework by suitably re-defining
the function α pXeq, which represents the financier’s Ambiguity aversion.
In sum, we have three types of agents: entrepreneurs, financiers, and consumers. The study of
economies populated by these types of agents (in the way we have defined them above) poses entirely
new problems. We refer the interested reader to [2] for a preliminary inquiry into the properties of
entrepreneurial economies, including equilibria and welfare considerations. In this paper, we focus
on the microfoundations underlying an entrepreneurial economy: we study the way in which an
entrepreneur and a financier interact, as micro actors. In Section 4 of this paper, we argue that this
interaction is a problem of contracting between the entrepreneur and the financier that we call a
problem of contracting for innovation.
4. Contracting for Innovation
Our previous discussion leads to the following problem. An entrepreneur comes up with a new idea.
Not having enough wealth to implement it, he goes to a financier and describes his project, hoping
to obtain the necessary funds. We have seen that the entrepreneur’s project – the innovation – is a
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pair pSe,Xeq, where Se contains the publicly observable states as well as the new states envisioned by
the entrepreneur, and Xe : Se Ñ R expresses the monetary return of the project as a function of the
contingencies in Se. On his end, the entrepreneur has (in his subjective opinion) a clear probabilistic
view of the new world that he has envisioned. This is described by a probability measure Pe (see
Appendix A for a precise definition of this probability and of the σ-algebra Σe on which it is defined).
On the other end, the financier, by facing a set of states he had never conceived of, perceives some
Ambiguity in the entrepreneur’s description. This is described by the fact that the financier evaluates
the project by using a functional of the form (3.1) above. Two features place this problem outside
the realm of standard contract theory. First, we have heterogeneity in the parties’ beliefs: their
views are different and, in fact, they are formed independently of each other. Second, one of the
parties perceives Ambiguity, i.e., this party’s beliefs are not represented by a probability measure.
The remainder of this section will formalize this contracting problem, and Section 5 will discuss its
solution.
4.1. Definition of a Contract. The formal definition of an innovation contract is as follows.
Definition 4.1 (Innovation Contract). An innovation contract (or contract) between an en-
trepreneur and a financier is a pair pH,Y q, where H ě 0 and Y P B pΣeq is such that Y ď Xe.
The interpretation is that a contract is a scheme according to which the financier pays H (which
may be 0) to the entrepreneur, and in exchange receives a claim on part of the amount Xe psq, which
obtains when the state of the world s P S realizes. This claim may consist of all Xe psq or just
a part of it. The amount that the entrepreneur receives when s P S realizes is denoted by Y psq
(which may be 0). In the definition, we demand that the function Y p¨q be an element of B pΣeq, the
Banach space of bounded measurable functions on the σ-algebra Σe. In turn, this is defined as the
coarsest σ-algebra which makes the function Xe measurable. The condition Y P B pΣeq encodes the
informational constraints that the parties face at the moment of writing a contract. Intuitively, the
condition simply states that the parties write the contract on the basis of the information available
to them and no more than that (for more on this issue, the reader is referred to Appendix A of this
paper). The definition includes as special cases the following types of contracts:
(a) The financier simply buys the project, and has no further obligation toward the entrepreneur.
This obtains for Y psq “ 0, for every s P S;
(b) The financiers acquires ownership of the project. When the state s P S realizes, he obtains
the amount Xe psq and transfers Y psq to the entrepreneur;
(c) The entrepreneur retains ownership of the project, but commits to paying the amount Z psq “
Xe psq ´ Y psq to the financier when s P S realizes. He does so in exchange for an up front
(that is, before the uncertainty resolves) payment of H;
(d) The entrepreneur transfers part of the ownership to the financier in exchange for H, and the
parties agree to a sharing rule that specifies that when s P S realizes the amount Z psq “
Xe psq ´ Y psq goes to the financier and the amount Y psq goes to the entrepreneur.
In a static setting, the distinction between cases (b), (c) and (d) is purely a matter of interpretation
because the contract is formally the same. However, case (a) differs from the other three cases in
that in case (a) one can actually talk of a transfer of ownership.
Example 4.2 (Publishing). In the case of “Author meets Publisher”, the innovation is a new book,
or music, or film, or other intellectual property. In publishing, the up-front payment H is called the
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“advance”. The Publisher purchases the residual claim on the work, and contracts to pay the Author
a royalty stream based on sales revenue, which corresponds to the function Y .
In the remainder of the paper, the subscripts e will be suppressed (except from the entrepreneur’s
utility function) since we are going to consider one entrepreneur only. Consequently, the measurable
space pSe,Σeq will be denoted by pS,Σq.
4.2. The Entrepreneur. As previously mentioned, the entrepreneur has, in his subjective opinion, a
clear probabilistic view of the new world S he has envisioned. This view is represented by a (countably
additive) probability measure P on pS,Σq, which he uses to evaluate the possible contracts that he
might sign. Formally,
Assumption 4.3. The entrepreneur evaluates contracts by means of the Subjective Expected Utility
(SEU) criterion ż
ue pY q dP, Y P B pΣq
where ue : RÑ R is the entrepreneur’s utility for monetary outcomes.
Mainly for reasons of comparison with other parts of the contracting literature, we assume that
the uncertainty on S is diffused. Precisely, we assume the following.
Assumption 4.4. X is a continuous random variable on the probability space pS,Σ, P q. That is,
P ˝X´1 is nonatomic.
Finally, we make the following assumption on the entrepreneur’s utility function.
Assumption 4.5. The entrepreneur’s utility function ue satisfies the following properties:
(1) ue p0q “ 0;
(2) ue is strictly increasing and strictly concave;
(3) ue is continuously differentiable;
(4) ue is bounded.
Thus, in particular, we assume that the entrepreneur is risk-averse.
4.3. The Financier. When presented with the innovation ppS,Σq ,Xq, the financier ϕ perceives
Ambiguity. This is represented by the set Cϕ (of probabilities on SP Y Se whose conditional on SP
is Pϕ) which appears in equation (3.1), above. In order to describe the financier’s evaluation of the
innovation, we are going to restrict to a sub-class of the functionals of type (3.1): that of Choquet
Expected Utility (CEU). This class still allows for a wide variety of behavior as these functionals need
not be either concave or convex. In the CEUmodel introduced by Schmeidler [52], the functional (3.1)
takes the form of an integral (in the sense of Choquet) with respect to a non-additive, monotone
set function (a capacity). While the use of Choquet integrals has become quite common in the
applications of decision theory, it is probably still not part of the toolbox of most professionals. We
have included a few basic facts about capacities and Choquet integrals in Appendix B.1. In sum, a
financier ϕ is described as follows.
10 MASSIMILIANO AMARANTE, MARIO GHOSSOUB, AND EDMUND PHELPS
Assumption 4.6. The financier evaluates contract by means of the functional Φ : B pΣq Ñ R defined
by
Φ pY q “
ż
uϕ pY q dυ, Y P B pΣq
where uϕ : RÑ R is the financier’s utility for money, υ is a capacity on Σ and the integral is taken
in the sense of Choquet (see Appendix B.1).
In line with Assumption 4.4, we also assume the following:
Assumption 4.7. υ is a continuous capacity (see Appendix B.1).
Finally, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 4.8. The financier is risk-neutral. We take uϕ to be the identity on R.
Henceforth, we will assume that the random variable X which describes the profitability of the
project is a positive random variable, that is X P B` pΣq. This is without loss of generality since it
can always be obtained by suitably re-normalizing the parties utility functions.
4.4. The Contracting Problem. The problem of finding an optimal innovation contract pH,Y q
may be split into two parts: we first determine the optimal Y given H, and then use this to find
the optimal H. In line with the description of economic agents of Section 3, we have in mind
situations characterized by the fact that, while the entrepreneur is the sole potential provider of the
innovation, there is competition among financiers to acquire it. Hence, the problem of finding an
optimal contingent payment scheme Y can be formulated as follows
sup
Y PBpΣq
ż
ue pW
e
0 `H ´X ` Y q dP(4.1)
s.t. 0 ď Y ď Xż
pX ´ Y q dυ ě p1` ρqH
The argument of the utility ue in problem (4.1) is the entrepreneur’s wealth as a function of the
state s P S that will realize
W e psq “W e0 `H ´X psq ` Y psq
where W e0 denotes the entrepreneur’s initial wealth, which can be zero. None of our results will be
modified if the entrepreneur’s initial wealth is assumed to be zero. Clearly, W e p¨q is a measurable
function on pS,Σq. The last constraint is the financier’s participation constraint. It states that a
necessary condition for the financier to offer the contract is that his evaluation of the random variable
X ´ Y (the amount that he receives, as a function of the state, if he signs the contract) be at least
as high as the amount H that he has to pay up front to the entrepreneur. In fact, the financier’s
evaluation of X ´ Y might have to be strictly higher than H since by funding the entrepreneur the
financier might give up other investment opportunities, for instance those present in the standard
asset market defined by SP , the publicly known states. This condition is expressed by the factor
p1` ρq, where ρ ě 0. The other constraint (0 ď Y ď X) expresses two conditions: (i) the right-hand
inequality states that, in each state of the world, the transfer from the financier to the entrepreneur
does not exceed the profitability of the project; and, (ii) the left-hand inequality states that a transfer
from the financier to the entrepreneur is nonnegative.
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Once problem (4.1) is solved and the optimal contingent payment scheme Y ˚H is determined as a
function of H, the next step is to determine the optimal H. This is typically an easier problem to
handle, and it is solved with standard methods.
4.5. Truthful Revelation of the Profitability of the Project. When studying a problem of
contracting in a situation of uncertainty, one typically adds one more constraint to the ones we
considered above. This is a monotonicity constraint that, in our case, would stipulate that the
payment from the financier to the entrepreneur is an increasing function of X, that is Y “ Ξ ˝X for
some increasing function Ξ : RÑ R. This would guarantee that the entrepreneur does not downplay
the profitability of the project. For the moment, we ignore this problem altogether. The reason is
that, in our main theorem, we will show that the monotonicity of Y is a feature that appears in all
optimal innovation contracts that we determine. Notice that this feature guarantees that, even in the
case where the project profitability depends on (state-contingent) unobserved actions taken by the
entrepreneur, there would be neither adverse selection nor moral hazard problems with our optimal
contracts.
5. Existence and Monotonicity of an Optimal Innovation Contract
In this section, we show that the contracting problem (problem (4.1) of Section 4) between the
entrepreneur and the financier admits a solution. Moreover, we show that this solution is increasing
in X, thus clearing up the field from concerns of project’s misrepresentation on the part of the
entrepreneur.
In a Bayesian setting (“ no Ambiguity), Milgrom [39] has shown that the key assumption for
obtaining monotonicity properties of optimal solutions is the Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLR)
property. In fact, this is precisely how truth-telling obtains in a contracting problem without Am-
biguity. The trouble for us is that the MLR property cannot be exported to our setting. The MLR
condition is the monotonicity property of the ratio of the two density functions, which represent
the parties’ beliefs in the standard Bayesian setting. In our setting, the financier is not a Bayesian
decision maker, and his beliefs cannot be represented by means of a density function. A way around
this problem is provided by Ghossoub [23]. In his study of insurance problems under heterogeneous
beliefs, he introduced a novel condition, called vigilance, which plays a role similar to that of the MLR
property. The vigilance condition displays two remarkable properties. First, it is strictly weaker than
the MLR property; that is, whenever the two can be defined simultaneously, the MLR property im-
plies vigilance but the converse is not true. Second, owing to its formulation, the vigilance condition
can easily be exported to settings involving any type of non-additive beliefs. Below is the extension
that we need.
Definition 5.1 (Vigilance). Let υ be a capacity on Σ, let P be a measure on the same σ-algebra
and let X be a random variable on pS,Σq. We say that υ is pP,Xq-vigilant if for any Y1,Y2 P B
` pΣq
such that
(i) Y1 and Y2 have the same distribution under P ; and
(ii) Y2 and X are comonotonic
2 (Y2 is a nondecreasing function of X),
the following holds ż
pX ´ Y2q dυ ě
ż
pX ´ Y1q dυ
2For the definition of comonotonic functions, see Appendix B.1.
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As the concept of vigilance and its application to non-additive settings are rather new, we remark
below that certain classes of capacities that have repeatedly appeared in robust statistics, decision
theory and finance (asset pricing and market structure) are in fact pP,Xq-vigilant.
Example 5.2 (Wasserman-Kadane Symmetric Capacities). Capacities have a long and rich tradition
in robust statistics (see, for instance, Huber and Ronchetti [29]). An important class of capacities
are the symmetric capacities introduced by Wasserman and Kadane [56].
Definition 5.3. Let pS,Σ, P q be a probability space. A capacity υ on pS,Σq is said to be Wasserman-
Kadane P -symmetric if for any two random variables Z1 and Z2 on pS,Σ, P q that are identically
distributed for P , one has ż
Z1dυ “
ż
Z2dυ
It is easy to verify that Wasserman-Kadane P -symmetric capacities on pS,Σq are pP,Xq-vigilant.
Example 5.4 (Weighted Probability Measures). Another class of capacities that is used in robust
statistics is the class of weakly symmetric capacities of Wasserman and Kadane [56] and Kadane and
Wasserman [32].
Definition 5.5. Let pS,Σ, P q be a probability space. A capacity υ on pS,Σq is said to be weakly
P -Symmetric if for any A,B P Σ, one has:
P pAq “ P pBq ùñ υ pAq “ υ pBq
An example of a weakly P -symmetric capacity is a distorted (weighted) probability measure of
the form T ˝ P , where T : r0, 1s Ñ r0, 1s is an increasing function with T p0q “ 0 and T p1q “ 1.
The function T is called a probability weighting (or distortion) function. Distortions of probability
measures have played a major role in the theory of choice under uncertainty since the work of Yaari
[57], Quiggin [47], and Kahneman and Tversky [33, 55]. It is easy to verify that all capacities that
are distortions of the probability measure P are pP,Xq-vigilant.
We can now state our main result. Its proof is given in Appendix C.
Theorem 5.6 (Truth-Telling Optimal Innovation Contracts). If υ is pP,Xq vigilant, then
problem (4.1) admits a solution Y which is comonotonic with X; that is, there exists an optimal
innovation contract which is truth-telling.
6. Ambiguity-Loving Financiers
In Section 3, we mentioned that a fairly general description of the way financiers deal with Ambi-
guity is provided by the functionals of the form (see equation (3.1), Section 3)
Φ pXeq “ α pXeq min
QPCϕ
ż
uϕ pXeq dQ`
´
1´ α pXeq
¯
max
QPCϕ
ż
uϕ pXeq dQ
where the coefficient α p¨q is allowed to vary with the project to be evaluated. The variability of the
coefficient expresses the financier’s preference for certain projects over others, maybe because they
are closer to his subjective vision (we pointed out in Section 3 that we can allow for financiers to
have a subjective visions by simply re-defining the function α p¨q). A natural special case of this
description obtains when the coefficient α p¨q is constant. This would represent the case where the
financier is not really concerned about the kind of Ambiguity he faces. Rather, he is only interested
INNOVATION, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND KNIGHTIAN UNCERTAINTY 13
in the fact that there is Ambiguity, and he is willing to bet on its resolution. Since financiers have
to be willing to deal with Ambiguity, it suffices to focus on the case α “ 0 (in fact, the case α “ 1
identifies the consumers; see Section 3):
(6.1) Φ pXeq “ max
QPCϕ
ż
uϕ pXeq dQ
By a result of Schmeidler [51], a subclass of these functionals obtains as a special case of Choquet
integrals. Precisely, a Choquet integral can be written in the form (6.1) if and only if the capacity
that defines it is submodular (see Appendix B.1). In this case, we can give a characterization of the
solution whose existence we proved in Theorem 5.6. Proposition 6.1 below shows that, when the
capacity representing the financier is submodular, an optimal solution to the contracting problem
(4.1) is the same as the solution of another contracting problem, which involves heterogeneity but
no Ambiguity. It is important to stress, as the proof of Proposition 6.1 makes it clear, that this is
not a statement about the type of uncertainty involved in this problem (4.1) but only a device which
allows us to characterize the solution. The usefulness of the equivalence proved in Proposition 6.1
stems from the fact that the solution can now be characterized by using the methods introduced
in Ghossoub [23]. In fact, as we shall see in Section 7, under some mild additional conditions, this
solution can even be characterized analytically.
So, let us assume that the capacity υ representing the financier in Assumption 4.6 is submodular.
Then, the functional Φ takes the form (6.1). The set Cϕ is a non-empty, weak
˚-compact and convex
set of probability measures, and it is called the anticore of υ. For Q P Cϕ, consider the following
problem
sup
Y PBpΣq
ż
ue pW
e
0 `H ´X ` Y q dP(6.2)
s.t. 0 ď Y ď Xż
pX ´ Y q dQ ě p1` ρqH
That is, problem (6.2) is a problem similar to problem (4.1) but (ideally) involves a financier that
is an Expected-Utility maximizer, with Q P Cϕ being the probability representing the financier. If
Q is pP,Xq-vigilant, then by Theorem 5.6, problem (6.2) for Q P Cϕ admits a solution which is
comonotonic with X. Let us denote by Y ˚ pQq this optimal solution.
Proposition 6.1. If the capacity υ in Assumption 4.6 is submodular, and if every Q P anticore pυq
is pP,Xq-vigilant, then there exists a Q˚ P anticore pυq such that Y ˚ pQ˚q solves the contracting
problem (4.1).
It is perhaps superfluous to stress that Proposition 6.1 does not say that a financier described
by equation (6.1) behaves just like an EU-maximizer with subjective probability measure Q˚: when
presented with a contract Y ‰ Y ˚, the financier described by equation (6.1) will evaluate Y using a
probability measure Q ‰ Q˚. Equivalently, Proposition 6.1 is only a statement that a maximum is
obtained, but this simple observation buys us a lot of mileage. We refer the reader to Ghossoub [23]
for an extensive inquiry into the properties of these solutions. Inspection of the proof of Proposition
6.1 (Appendix D) shows that this result can be extended to general functionals of the form (6.1),
that is functionals of the form (6.1) that are not necessarily Choquet integrals.
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Corollary 6.2. Assume that in problem (4.1) the financier is described by a functional of the form
Φ pXeq “ max
QPC
ż
uϕ pXeq dQ
where C is a weak˚-compact set of probability measures on pS,Σq. If there exists a solution Y ˚˚ to
the contracting problem, and if every Q P C is pP,Xq-vigilant, then there exists a Q˚ P C such that
Y ˚˚ “ Y ˚ pQ˚q.
7. The Case of a Probability Distortion
In the previous sections, we have ascertained the existence of an optimal contract Y ˚ as a function
of X, which in turn is a function of the states of the world. We have also established that such a
contract would have the truth-telling property. While this is a necessary and fundamental result, it is
still quite far from telling us how to write a contract were we financiers meeting with an entrepreneur.
We now turn to filling this gap. What we seek is an explicit formula giving us the contract Y ˚ as a
function of the entrepreneur’s project X. By obtaining this result, we would achieve a full range of
applicability for our theory, since by inputting the entrepreneur’s project we would be able to actually
write the optimal contract (depending on the financier’s view of uncertainty). In this section, we do
present this result, but we need some additional assumptions to achieve it. While these assumptions
are certainly limiting, we believe that the restricted setting they identify is still very interesting.
Moreover, both the result and our methods of achieving it may provide a valuable guide for writing
down optimal contracts in more general settings, for instance through approximation procedures.
We have already encountered probability distortions (Example 5.4 above) and mentioned that
they have found fruitful applications in decision theory, robust statistics and finance. In this section,
we show that when the financier’s beliefs are represented by a probability distortion, it is possible
to obtain an explicit analytical form of the optimal innovation contract. This full characterization is
helpful in practice since it permits to actually compute the optimal innovation contract as a function
of the underlying innovation.
When the financier’s beliefs are a distortion of a probability measure, it is convenient to replace
the assumption of vigilance with two assumptions (Assumption 7.4 and Assumption 7.7 below) that
closely mimic the Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLR) assumption. Similar assumptions have been
extensively used in the recent literature, as discussed below.
Thus, let us suppose that the financier’s capacity υ is of the form υ “ T ˝Q, for some probability
measure Q ‰ P on pS,Σq and some function T : r0, 1s Ñ r0, 1s, which is increasing, concave, and
continuous with T p0q “ 0 and T p1q “ 1. Then, T ˝ Q is a submodular capacity on pS,Σq. In this
setting, Assumption 4.4 and Assumption 4.7 of Section 4 are restated as follows.
Assumption 7.1. We assume that υ “ T ˝Q, where:
(1) Q is a probability measure on pS,Σq such that Q ˝X´1 is nonatomic;
(2) T : r0, 1s Ñ r0, 1s is increasing, concave and continuously differentiable; and,
(3) T p0q “ 0, T p1q “ 1, and T 1 p0q ă `8.
Kahneman and Tversky [33] interpret the slope of the probability weighting function as a measure
of the sensitivity of preferences to very small changes in probabilities. Adopting such a viewpoint,
the condition T 1 p0q ă `8 states that the financier is not overly sensitive to small changes in
probabilities of very unlikely events. We will also assume that the lump-sum start-up financing H
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that the entrepreneur receives from the financier guarantees a nonnegative wealth process for the
entrepreneur. This can be interpreted as a limited liability assumption. Specifically, we shall assume
the following.
Assumption 7.2. X ďW e0 `H, P -a.s.
In order to state the next assumption – the one that replaces vigilance in this setting – we need
to introduce a certain amount of notation. The reader who is not interested in the details can skim
through this part, and simply record the results contained in Theorem 7.5 and Corollary 7.8. For each
Z P B`pΣq, let FZ ptq “ Q
`
ts P S : Z psq ď tu
˘
denote the distribution function of Z with respect to
the probability measure Q, and let F´1Z ptq be the left-continuous inverse of the distribution function
FZ (that is, the quantile function of Z), defined by
(7.1) F´1Z ptq “ inf
!
z P R` : FZ pzq ě t
)
, @t P r0, 1s
Definition 7.3. Denote by AQuant the collection of all quantile functions f of the form F´1, where
F is the distribution function of some Z P B` pΣq such that 0 ď Z ď X.
That is, AQuant is the collection of all quantile functions f that satisfy the following properties:
(1) f pzq ď F´1X pzq, for each 0 ă z ă 1;
(2) f pzq ě 0, for each 0 ă z ă 1.
Denoting by Quant “
!
f : p0, 1q Ñ R
ˇˇˇ
f is nondecreasing and left-continuous
)
the collection of
all quantile functions, we can then write AQuant as follows:
(7.2) AQuant “
!
f P Quant : 0 ď f pzq ď F´1X pzq , for each 0 ă z ă 1
)
By Lebesgue’s Decomposition Theorem [1, Th. 10.61] there exists a unique pair pPac, Psq of (non-
negative) finite measures on pS,Σq such that:
‚ P “ Pac ` Ps;
‚ Pac ăă Q (Pac is absolutely continuous with respect to Q); and,
‚ Ps K Q (Ps and Q are mutually singular).
That is, for all B P Σ, Pac pBq “ 0 whenever Q pBq “ 0. Moreover, there exists some A P Σ such
that Q pSzAq “ Ps pAq “ 0, which then implies that Pac pSzAq “ 0 and Q pAq “ 1. Note also that for
all Z P B pΣq,
ş
Z dP “
ş
A
Z dPac `
ş
SzA Z dPs. Furthermore, by the Radon-Nikody´m Theorem [15,
Th. 4.2.2] there exists a Q-a.s. unique Σ-measurable and Q-integrable function h : S Ñ r0,`8q such
that Pac pCq “
ş
C
h dQ, for all C P Σ. Hence, for all Z P B pΣq,
ş
Z dP “
ş
A
Zh dQ `
ş
SzA Z dPs.
Also, since Pac pSzAq “ 0, it follows that
ş
SzAZ dPs “
ş
SzAZ dP . Thus, for all Z P B pΣq,ş
Z dP “
ş
A
Zh dQ`
ş
SzAZ dP .
Moreover, since h : S Ñ r0,`8q is Σ-measurable and Q-integrable, there exists a Borel-measurable
and Q˝X´1-integrable map φ : X pSq Ñ r0,`8q such that h “ dPac{dQ “ φ˝X. We will also make
the following assumption, which can be interpreted as a kind of monotone likelihood ratio property.
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Assumption 7.4. The Σ-measurable function h “ φ ˝ X “ dPac{dQ is anti-comonotonic with X,
i.e., φ is nonincreasing.
7.1. A Characterization of An Optimal Innovation Contract. Since Q ˝ X´1 is nonatomic
(by Assumption 7.1), it follows that FX pXq has a uniform distribution over p0, 1q [20, Lemma A.21],
that is, Q
`
ts P S : FX pXq psq ď tu
˘
“ t for each t P p0, 1q. Letting U :“ FX pXq, it follows that U is
a random variable on the probability space pS,Σ, Qq with a uniform distribution on p0, 1q. Consider
the following quantile problem:
For a given β ěp1` ρqH,
sup
f
V pfq “
ż
ue
`
W e0 `H ´ f pUq
˘
φ
`
F´1X pUq
˘
dQ(7.3)
s.t. f P AQuantż
T 1 p1´ Uq f pUq dQ “ β
The following theorem characterizes the solution of the entrepreneur’s problem (problem (4.1)
with υ “ T ˝ Q) in terms of the solution of the relatively easier quantile problem given in problem
(7.3), provided the previous assumptions hold. The proof is given in Appendix E.
Theorem 7.5. Under the previous assumptions, there exists a parameter β˚ ě p1` ρqH such that
if f˚ is optimal for problem (7.3) with parameter β˚, then the function
Y ˚ “
`
X ´ f˚ pUq
˘
1A `X1SzA
is optimal for problem (4.1) (with υ “ T ˝Q).
In particular, Y ˚ “ X ´ f˚ pUq , Q-a.s. That is, the set E of states of the world s such that
Y ˚ psq ‰
´
X ´ f˚ pUq
¯
psq has probability 0 under the probability measure Q (and hence υ pEq “
T ˝Q pEq “ 0). The contract that is optimal for the entrepreneur will be seen by the financier to be
almost surely equal to the function X ´ f˚ pUq.
Another immediate implication of Theorem 7.5 is that the collection of states of the world in which
the optimal innovation contract is a full transfer rule is a set of states to which the financier assigns
a zero likelihood. On the set of all other states of the world, the innovation contract deviates from
a full transfer rule by the function f˚ pUq.
Under the following two assumptions, it is possible to fully characterize the shape of an optimal
innovation contract. This is done in Corollary 7.8.
Assumption 7.6. The Σ-measurable function h “ φ˝X “ dPac{dQ is such that φ is left-continuous.
Assumption 7.7. the function t ÞÑ T
1p1´tq
φpF´1X ptqq
, defined on t P p0, 1q ztt : φ ˝ F´1x ptq “ 0u, is nonde-
creasing.
Assumption 7.7 is also a monotone likelihood ratio type assumption. Similar assumptions have
been used in Jin and Zhou [31] in their study of portfolio choice under Prospect Theory, in He and
Zhou [27] in their study of a portfolio choice problem under Yaari’s [57] Dual Theory of choice,
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in Jin and Zhou [30] in their study of greed and leverage within a portfolio choice problem under
Prospect Theory, and in Carlier and Dana [12] in their study of the demand for contingent claims
under Rank-Dependent Expected Utility [47].
When the previous assumptions hold, we can give an explicit characterization of an optimal con-
tract, as follows.
Corollary 7.8 (The Shape of an Optimal Innovation Contract). Under the previous assump-
tions, there exists a parameter β˚ ě p1` ρqH such that an optimal solution Y ˚ for problem (4.1)
(with υ “ T ˝Q) takes the form
Y ˚ “ min
”
X,max
´
0,X ´ d
¯ı
1A `X1SzA,
where
d “W e0 `H ´
`
u1e
˘´1ˆ´λ˚T 1 p1´ Uq
φ pXq
˙
,
U “ FX pXq, and λ
˚ ď 0 is chosen so thatż
T 1 p1´ Uqmax
«
0,min
#
X,W e0 `H ´
`
u1e
˘´1ˆ´λ˚T 1 p1´ Uq
φ pXq
˙+ﬀ
dQ “ β˚
The proof of Corollary 7.8 is given in Appendix F. Note that if Assumption 7.4 holds, then
Assumption 7.6 is a weak assumption3.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we have tackled some of the basic issues associated with the idea of entrepreneurial
economy. We have departed from the classical tradition by introducing the notion of publicly known
states of the world. We argued that this notion not only increases the realism of economic models
but that it also allows one to unveil the true role played by entrepreneurs and financiers in actual
economies. We have, then, defined an innovation as a collection of new states (conceived by the
entrepreneur/innovator) together with an asset that pays contingent on these new states as well as
on the publicly known ones. We believe that one of the main virtues of our definition is that it makes
it clear that the process of innovation changes the fundamentals of the economy as it is associated to
the appearance of new possibilities. Due to its nature, an innovation generates Knightian uncertainty
(Ambiguity) for agents in the economy, except for the entrepreneur/innovator, and we have classified
the agents with respect to the attitude that they display toward this Ambiguity. Those agents that
are not strictly averse to this Ambiguity have been called financiers. We argued that at the core of
this entrepreneurial economy lies a problem of contracting between an entrepreneur and a financier.
We called this problem a problem of contracting for innovation. It is a contracting problem involving
not only belief heterogeneity, but also Ambiguity. We showed existence and monotonicity (truth-
telling) of optimal innovation contracts. We characterized these contracts in the case of financiers
that are globally ambiguity-seeking, and we found an explicit analytical form for the innovation
contract when the financiers’ perceived ambiguity is represented by a probability distortion.
The literature on innovation is vast. Spanning from Schumpeter [53] to the works of Reinganum
[48], Romer [49], Scotchmer [54] and Boldrin and Levine [7], it contains many more important papers
3Indeed, any monotone function is Borel-measurable and hence “almost continuous”, in view of Lusin’s Theorem
[18, Theorem 7.5.2]. Also, any monotone function is almost surely continuous for Lebesgue measure.
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than we could reasonably cite here. We refer to Bianchi and Henrekson [5], Endres and Woods [19],
and Pollock [46] for an overview of the literature. It is probably fair to say that most of the literature
has focused on a particular aspect of innovation or on a particular role played by it, a choice usually
dictated by the problem under study (see Bianchi and Henrekson [5] for a discussion). The definition
that we have introduced in this paper is an attempt to account simultaneously for all those aspects.
In this way, we hope that it will appear as a concept that can be easily exported and particularized
to any setting where the intuitive idea of innovation might play a significant role.
Undoubtedly, our construction has a strong Schumpeterian flavor: the entrepreneur is the creator
of the innovation4, the entrepreneur is a singular actor, our financiers are quite like Schumpeter’s
bankers, the functional classification of the economic agents, etc. Clearly, there are considerable
differences as well. The most notable is in the definition of innovation: ours is a far reaching
generalization of Schumpeter’s notion, which consists only of a new combination of the inputs in
the productive process. Another difference worth stressing is the following. Schumpeter’s work,
as it is well-known, is regarded as a celebration of the entrepreneur: this is viewed as a privileged
individual that, in a condition of severe uncertainty (the newly thought states), has a “vision” (the
project/asset) that might change the course of the economy5. While this is true in our construction
as well, the appearance of this “vision” would be rather inconsequential if it were not coupled with
another “vision”, that of the financier. In our construction, the vision of the entrepreneur leads to the
appearance of Ambiguity. It is only the insight of the financier into this Ambiguity that recognizes
the vision of the entrepreneur and makes the change possible. Formally, this insight appears in the
form of the coefficient α pXeq being low enough, which means precisely that the financier believes in
the profitability of the entrepreneur’s project.
Unlike the literature on innovation, the literature on contracting under heterogeneity and Am-
biguity is not vast, but it does enlist several important papers, which tackle a variety of issues
(see, for instance, [40, 41, 42]). Important contributions to the problem of existence and mono-
tonicity of an optimal contract in situations of Ambiguity and/or heterogeneity have been made in
[8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16]. Carlier and Dana [9, 10] and Dana [16] show existence and monotonicity in
settings characterized by the presence of Ambiguity but where there is no heterogeneity. Carlier and
Dana [8] study a setting similar to ours, but impose the additional restriction that the capacity of
one party is a distortion of the probability of the other party, thus retaining a certain (weak) form
of homogeneity. Chateauneuf, Dana and Tallon [14] allow for capacities (i.e., Ambiguity) on both
sides, but they assume that both capacities are submodular distortions and that the state space is
finite. Finally, Carlier and Dana [11] also allow for capacities on both sides, but demand that both
capacities be distortions of the same measure, and that the heterogeneity be “small” (in a sense made
precise in that paper). In relation to this literature, we have contributed an existence and mono-
tonicity result in a setting where, while we have Ambiguity only on one side, we allow for a larger
degree of heterogeneity. To this, we have also added the characterization of Section 6 obtained under
the additional assumption of a submodular (concave) capacity (but which also covers the general
maxmax case) as well as the explicit analytical form of the optimal innovation contract of Section 7.
4Schumpeter distinguishes between those who create ideas and those, the entrepreneurs, who turn them into some-
thing of economic value. Roughly, in our model this would correspond to distinguishing between those who come up
with the new states (inventors) and those who make those states suitable of generating economic value (entrepreneurs)
by issuing assets that pay contingent on those states.
5In Schumpeter’s work, the entrepreneur faces Ambiguity, while in our construction all of his uncertainty is reduced
to Risk. This is not a substantial difference as we could allow for the entrepreneur to be described by non-additive
criteria. This would result only in a technical complication without changing the essence of the problems we study.
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Appendix A. Informational constraints as measurability conditions
This Appendix briefly discusses two aspects of the contracting problem that are seemingly tech-
nical. In fact, these aspects play a substantial role not only here but also elsewhere, for instance in
the problem of whether or not a central authority is able to replicate the outcomes produced by an
economy with innovation. In the present setting, the easiest way to grasp these aspects is also the
most intuitive: just think of an entrepreneur and a financier coming together into a room; the former
describes his project because he is seeking funding, and the latter has to decide what to do.
The first issue has to do with the measurable structure on the set Se. In our story, the financier
is somebody who not only sees the innovation, i.e., the pair pSe,Xeq, for the first time in his life
but has never conceived of it either. This implies that a contract between the financier and the
entrepreneur may only be written on the basis of the information that is revealed in the room. The
way to formalize this requirement is by endowing Se with the coarsest σ-algebra which makes Xe
measurable: this expresses precisely the fact that all the information available is derived from the
description of the innovation. We denote this σ-algebra by Σe. Accordingly, the innovation can
be written as ppSe,Σeq ,Xeq, and Xe is a random variable on pSe,Σeq. By Doob’s Measurability
Theorem [1, Theorem 4.41], any measurable function g on pSe,Σeq has the form g “ ζ ˝Xe, where
ζ is a Borel-measurable function R Ñ R. The collection of all bounded measurable functions on
pSe,Σeq is denoted by B pΣeq, and the set of its positive elements by B
` pΣeq.
The second issue has to do with the probability Pe according to which the entrepreneur evaluates
his own innovation. We assume that the entrepreneur declares truthfully this belief Pe, which is
thus a common knowledge among the parties. Formally, this probability is just a mathematical
representation of certain parts of the entrepreneur’s project. Thus, de facto, we assume that the
entrepreneur reveals truthfully (ex ante) some aspects of his project (precisely those that admit a
representation in the form of a probabilistic assessment). We believe that this assumption sounds
heavier than what it really is, and this is so for at least two reasons. First, when they come in contact
with each other, the entrepreneur knows nothing about the financier (formally, this is encoded in
the requirement on the σ-algebra). Thus, if he were to lie about those aspects of the project (i.e.,
declare a probability different from Pe), he would have no reason to think that this might increase his
chances to get funded. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the financier’s ambiguous beliefs (in
the non-additive sense) are formed independently of Pe. That is, the view the financier ends up with
after being presented with the innovation would be the same whether Pe or any other probability
is declared by the entrepreneur. Formally, what drives the feature that the financier might find the
project worthwhile is not the probability Pe but the coefficient of Ambiguity aversion αpXeq, which
depends only on the random variable Xe and not on the probability Pe.
We have mentioned that the probability describes certain aspects of the entrepreneur’s project. All
the other aspects are encoded in the mapping Xe, which expresses the gains/losses that the project
allegedly generates as a function of the new states. Needless to say, we do not make any assumption
about how truthfully this part is revealed, as this is the very essence of the contracting problem.
Appendix B. Background Material
B.1. Capacities and the Choquet Integral. Here, we summarize the basic definitions about
capacities, Choquet integrals and Sˇiposˇ integrals. The proofs of the statements listed below can be
found, for instance, in [38] or [43].
Definition B.1. A (normalized) capacity on a measurable space pS,Σq is a set function υ : ΣÑ r0, 1s
such that:
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(1) υ p∅q “ 0;
(2) υ pSq “ 1; and
(3) A,B P Σ and A Ă B ùñ υ pAq ď υ pBq.
Definition B.2. A capacity υ on pS,Σq is continuous from above (resp. below) if for any sequence
tAnuně1 Ď Σ such that An`1 Ď An (resp. An`1 Ě An) for each n, it holds that
lim
nÑ`8
υ pAnq “ υ
˜
`8č
n“1
An
¸ ˜
resp. lim
nÑ`8
υ pAnq “ υ
˜
`8ď
n“1
An
¸¸
A capacity that is continuous both from above and below is said to be continuous.
Definition B.3. Given a capacity υ and a function ψ P B pΣq, the Choquet integral of ψ w.r.t. υ is
defined by ż
φ dυ “
ż `8
0
υ pts P S : φ psq ě tuq dt`
ż 0
´8
rυ pts P S : φ psq ě tuq ´ 1s dt
where the integrals on the RHS are taken in the sense of Riemann.
Unlike the Lebesgue integral, the Choquet integral is not additive. One of its characterizing
properties, however, is that it respects additivity on comonotonic functions.
Definition B.4. Two functions Y1, Y2 P B pΣq are comonotonic if for all s, s
1 P S”
Y1psq ´ Y1ps
1q
ı”
Y2psq ´ Y2ps
1q
ı
ě 0
As mentioned above, if Y1, Y2 P B pΣq are comonotonic thenż
pY1 ` Y2q dυ “
ż
Y1dυ `
ż
Y2dυ
Definition B.5. A capacity υ on pS,Σq is submodular (or concave) if for any A,B P Σ
υ pAYBq ` υ pAXBq ď υ pAq ` υ pBq
It is supermodular (or convex) if the reverse inequality holds for any A,B P Σ.
As a functional on B pΣq, the Choquet integral
ş
¨ dυ is concave (resp. convex) if and only if υ is
submodular (resp. supermodular).
Proposition B.6. Let υ be a capacity on pS,Σq.
(1) If Y P B pΣq and c P R, then
ş
pY ` cq dυ “
ş
Y dυ ` c.
(2) If A P Σ then
ş
1A dυ “ υ pAq.
(3) If Y P B pΣq and a ě 0, then
ş
a Y dυ “ a
ş
Y dυ.
(4) If Y1, Y2 P B pΣq are such that Y1 ď Y2, then
ş
Y1 dυ ď
ş
Y2 dυ.
(5) If υ is submodluar, then for any Y1, Y2 P B pΣq,
ş
pY1 ` Y2q dυ ď
ş
Y1 dυ `
ş
Y2 dυ.
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Definition B.7. The Sˇiposˇ integral, or the symmetric Choquet integral (see [43]), is a functional
Sˇ : B pΣq Ñ R defined by
Sˇ pY q “
ż
Y `dυ ´
ż
Y ´dυ
where the integrals on the RHS are taken in the sense of Choquet and Y ` (resp. Y ´) denotes the
positive (resp. negative) part of Y P B pΣq. Obviously, the Sˇiposˇ integral coincides with the Choquet
integral for positive functions.
B.2. Nondecreasing Rearrangements. All the definitions and results that appear in this Appen-
dix are taken from Ghossoub [23, 24] and the references therein. We refer the interested reader to
Ghossoub [23, 24] for proofs and for additional results.
B.2.1. The Nondecreasing Rearrangement. Let pS,G, P q be a probability space, and let X P B` pGq
be a continuous random variable (i.e., P ˝X´1 is a nonatomic Borel probability measure) with range
X pSq “ r0,M s. Denote by Σ the σ-algebra generated by X, and let
φ pBq :“ P
´
ts P S : X psq P Bu
¯
“ P ˝X´1 pBq ,
for any Borel subset B of R.
For any Borel-measurable map I : r0,M s Ñ R, define the distribution function of I as the map
φI : R Ñ r0, 1s given by φI ptq :“ φ
`
tx P r0,M s : I pxq ď tu
˘
. Then φI is a nondecreasing right-
continuous function.
Definition B.8. Let I : r0,M s Ñ r0,M s be any Borel-measurable map, and define the functionrI : r0,M s Ñ R by
(B.1) rI ptq :“ inf !z P R` : φI pzq ě φ` r0, ts ˘)
Then rI is a nondecreasing and Borel-measurable mapping of r0,M s into r0,M s such that I and rI
are φ-equimeasurable, in the sense that for any α P r0,M s,
φ
´
tt P r0,M s : I ptq ď αu
¯
“ φ
´
tt P r0,M s : rI ptq ď αu¯
Moreover, if I : r0,M s Ñ R` is another nondecreasing, Borel-measurable map which is φ-
equimeasurable with I, then I “ rI, φ-a.s. rI is called the nondecreasing φ-rearrangement of I.
Now, define Y :“ I ˝ X and rY :“ rI ˝ X. Since both I and rI are Borel-measurable mappings
of r0,M s into itself, it follows that Y, rY P B` pΣq. Note also that rY is nondecreasing in X, in the
sense that if s1, s2 P S are such that X ps1q ď X ps2q then rY ps1q ď rY ps2q, and that Y and rY are
P -equimeasurable. That is, for any α P r0,M s, P
´
ts P S : Y psq ď αu
¯
“ P
´
ts P S : rY psq ď αu¯.
We will call rY a nondecreasing P -rearrangement of Y with respect to X, and we shall
denote it by rYP . Note that rYP is P -a.s. unique. Note also that if Y1 and Y2 are P -equimeasurable
and if Y1 P L1 pS,G, P q, then Y2 P L1 pS,G, P q and
ş
ψ pY1q dP “
ş
ψ pY2q dP , for any measurable
function ψ such that the integrals exist.
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B.2.2. Supermodularity and Hardy-Littlewood Inequalities. A partially ordered set (poset) is a pair
pA,Áq, where Á is a reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation on A. For any x, y P A,
we denote by x _ y (resp. x ^ y) the least upper bound (resp. greatest lower bound) of the set
tx, yu. A poset pA,Áq is a lattice when x _ y, x ^ y P A for every x, y P A. For instance, the
Euclidian space Rn is a lattice for the partial order Á defined as follows: for x “ px1, . . . , xnq P R
n
and y “ py1, . . . , ynq P R
n, we write x Á y when xi ě yi, for each i “ 1, . . . , n.
Definition B.9. Let pA,Áq be a lattice. A function L : AÑ R is said to be supermodular if for each
x, y P A,
L px_ yq ` L px^ yq ě L pxq ` L pyq
In particular, a function L : R2 Ñ R is supermodular if for any x1, x2, y1, y2 P R with x1 ď x2 and
y1 ď y2, we have
L px2, y2q ` L px1, y1q ě L px1, y2q ` L px2, y1q
It is then easily seen that supermodularity of a function L : R2 Ñ R is is equivalent to the function
η pyq “ L px` h, yq ´ L px, yq being nondecreasing for any x P R and h ě 0.
Example B.10. The following are useful examples of supermodular functions on R2:
(1) If g : R Ñ R is concave and a P R, then the function L1 : R
2 Ñ R defined by L1 px, yq “
g pa´ x` yq is supermodular;
(2) The function L2 : R
2 Ñ R defined by L2 px, yq “ ´ py ´ xq
` is supermodular;
(3) If η : R Ñ R` is a nonincreasing function, h : R Ñ R is concave and nondecreasing, and
a P R, then the function L3 : R
2 Ñ R defined by L3 px, yq “ h pa´ yq η pxq is supermodular.
Lemma B.11. Let Y P B` pΣq, and denote by rYP the nondecreasing P -rearrangement of Y with
respect to X. Then,
(1) If L is a supermodular and P ˝X´1-integrable function on the range of X thenż
L
´
X,Y
¯
dP ď
ż
L
´
X, rYP¯ dP
(2) If 0 ď Y ď X then 0 ď rYP ď X.
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 5.6
Let us denote by FSB the feasibility set for problem (4.1) (which we assume nonempty to rule out
trivial situations):
(C.1) FSB “
#
Y P B pΣq : 0 ď Y ď X and
ż
pX ´ Y q dυ ě p1` ρqH “ H 1
+
Let FÒSB be the set of all the Y P FSB which, in addition, are comonotonic with X:
F
Ò
SB “
!
Y “ I ˝X P FSB : I is nondecreasing
)
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Lemma C.1. If υ is pP,Xq-vigilant, then for each Y P FSB there exists a rY P FSB such that:
(1) rY is comonotonic with X,
(2)
ş
ue
´
W e0 `H ´X `
rY ¯ dP ě ş ue´W e0 `H ´X ` Y ¯dP ,
(3)
ş ´
X ´ rY ¯ dυ ě ş ´X ´ Y ¯dυ
Proof. Choose any Y “ I ˝ X P FSB , and let rYP denote the nondecreasing P -rearrangement of Y
with respect to X. Then (i) rYP “ rI ˝X where rI is nondecreasing, and (ii) 0 ď rYP ď X, by Lemma
B.11. Furthermore, since υ is pP,Xq-vigilant, it follows that
ş ´
X ´ rYP¯ dυ ě ş ´X ´ Y ¯dυ. Butş ´
X ´ Y
¯
dυ ě H 1 since Y P FSB. Hence, rYP P FÒSB . Moreover, since the utility ue is concave
(Assumption 4.5), the function U px, yq “ ue pW
e
0 `H ´ x` yq is supermodular (as in Example B.10
(1)). Then, by Lemma B.11,
ş
ue
´
W e0 `H ´X `
rY ¯ dP ě ş ue´W e0 `H ´X ` Y ¯dP . 
Now, by Lemma C.1, we can choose a maximizing sequence tYnun in F
Ò
SB for problem (4.1). That
is,
lim
nÑ`8
ż
ue pW
e
0 `H ´X ` Ynq dP “ N ” sup
Y PB`pΣq
#ż
ue pW
e
0 `H ´X ` Y q dP
+
ă `8
Since 0 ď Yn ď X ď M ” }X}8, the sequence tYnun is uniformly bounded. Moreover, for
each n ě 1 we have Yn “ In ˝ X, with In : r0,M s Ñ r0,M s. Consequently, the sequence tInun
is a uniformly bounded sequence of nondecreasing Borel-measurable functions. Thus, by Helly’s
First Theorem [13, Lemma 13.15] (a.k.a. Helly’s Compactness Theorem), there is a nondecreasing
function I˚ : r0,M s Ñ r0,M s and a subsequence tImum of tInun such that tImum converges pointwise
on r0,M s to I˚. Hence, I˚ is also Borel-measurable, and so Y ˚ “ I˚ ˝ X P B`pΣq is such that
0 ď Y ˚ ď X. Moreover, the sequence tYmum, Ym “ Im ˝X, converges pointwise to Y
˚. Thus, the
sequence tX´Ymum is uniformly bounded and converges pointwise to pX ´ Y
˚q. By the assumption
that υ is continuous (Assumption 4.7), it follows from a Dominated Convergence-type Theorem [43,
Theorem 7.16]6 that
H 1 ď lim
mÑ`8
ż
pX ´ Ymq dυ “
ż
pX ´ Y ˚q dυ
and so Y ˚ P FÒSB . Now, by continuity and boundedness of the function ue, and by Lebesgue’s
Dominated Convergence Theorem [1, Theorem 11.21], we haveż
ue pW
e
0 `H ´X ` Y
˚q dP “ lim
mÑ`8
ż
ue pW
e
0 `H ´X ` Ymq dP
“ lim
nÑ`8
ż
ue pW
e
0 `H ´X ` Ynq dP “ N
Hence Y ˚ solves problem (4.1). This concludes the proof of Theorem 5.6. l
6The Theorem of Pap [43] is for the Sˇiposˇ integral, or the symmetric Choquet integral. However, the latter coincides
with the Choquet integral for nonnegative functions (see Appendix B.1).
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Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 6.1
Let Cϕ denote the anticore of υ. Since each Q P Cϕ is pP,Xq-vigilant, it follows that υ is pP,Xq-
vigilant. Hence, by Theorem 5.6, there exists a solution Y ˚˚ to problem (4.1). Fix Q P Cϕ arbitrarily,
and let Y ˚ pQq be an optimal solution of problem (6.2) for this given Q P Cϕ. The existence of Y
˚ pQq
follows from the pP,Xq-vigilance ofQ, in light of Theorem 5.6. Then, Y ˚ pQq satisfies 0 ď Y ˚ pQq ď X
and
ş
pX ´ Y ˚ pQqq dQ ě p1` ρqH. Hence,
max
RPCϕ
ż
pX ´ Y ˚ pQqq dR ě
ż
pX ´ Y ˚ pQqq dQ ě p1` ρqH,
which shows that Y ˚ pQq is feasible for problem (4.1). Since Y ˚˚ solves problem (4.1), we must have
that
(D.1)
ż
ue pW
e
0 `H ´X ` Y
˚˚q dP ě
ż
ue pW
e
0 `H ´X ` Y
˚ pQqq dP
To conclude the proof, it suffices to find some Q˚˚ P Cϕ such that inequality (D.1) holds as an
equality. Suppose, by the way of contradiction, that no such Q˚˚ exists. Then, for all Q P Cϕ it holds
that
(D.2)
ż
ue pW
e
0 `H ´X ` Y
˚˚q dP ą
ż
ue pW
e
0 `H ´X ` Y
˚ pQqq dP
Since, by definition, Y ˚pQq solves the problem of type (6.2) defined by Q, inequality (D.2) implies
that Y ˚˚ must not be feasible for any problem of the type (6.2). That is, for all Q P Cϕ,ż
pX ´ Y ˚˚q dQ ă p1` ρqH
However, by the feasibility of Y ˚˚ for problem (4.1), we have that for all Q P Cϕ,ż
pX ´ Y ˚˚q dQ ă p1` ρqH ď max
RPCϕ
ż
pX ´ Y ˚˚q dR
which, since pX ´ Y ˚q P B pΣq, contradicts the fact that Cϕ is weak
˚-compact and convex. l
Appendix E. Proof of Theorem 7.5
E.1. “Splitting”. Recall that by Lebesgue’s Decomposition Theorem [1, Th. 10.61] there exists a
unique pair pPac, Psq of (nonnegative) finite measures on pS,Σq such that P “ Pac ` Ps, Pac ăă Q
and Ps K Q. That is, for all B P Σ with Q pBq “ 0, we have Pac pBq “ 0, and there is some A P Σ
such that Q pSzAq “ Ps pAq “ 0. It then also follows that Pac pSzAq “ 0 and Q pAq “ 1. In the
following, the Σ-measurable set A on which Q is concentrated is assumed to be fixed all throughout.
Consider now the following two problems:
For a given β ěp1` ρqH,
sup
Y PBpΣq
ż
A
ue
`
W e0 `H ´X ` Y
˘
dP(E.1)
s.t. 0 ď Y ď Xż
pX ´ Y q dT ˝Q “ β
and
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sup
Y PBpΣq
ż
SzA
ue
`
W e0 `H ´X ` Y
˘
dP(E.2)
s.t. 0 ď Y 1SzA ď X1SzAż
SzA
pX ´ Y q dT ˝Q “ 0
Remark E.1. By the boundedness of ue, the supremum of each of the above two problems is finite
when their feasibility sets are nonempty. Now, the function X is feasible for problem (E.2), and so
problem (E.2) has a nonempty feasibility set.
Definition E.2. For a given β ě p1` ρqH, let ΘA,β be the feasibility set of problem (E.1) with
parameter β. That is,
ΘA,β :“
#
Y P B` pΣq : 0 ď Y ď X,
ż
pX ´ Y q dT ˝Q “ β
+
Denote by Γ the collection of all β for which the feasibility set ΘA,β is nonempty:
Definition E.3. Let Γ :“
!
β ě p1` ρqH : ΘA,β ‰ ∅
)
Lemma E.4. Γ ‰ ∅.
Proof. Choose Y P FSB arbitrarily, where FSB is defined by equation (C.1). Then Y P B
` pΣq is
such that 0 ď Y ď X and
ş
pX ´ Y q dT ˝ Q ě p1` ρqH. Let βY “
ş
pX ´ Y q dT ˝ Q. Then,
by definition of βY , and since 0 ď Y ď X, we have Y P ΘA,βY , and so ΘA,βY ‰ ∅. Consequently,
βY P Γ, and so Γ ‰ ∅. 
Lemma E.5. X is optimal for problem (E.2).
Proof. The feasibility of X for problem (E.2) is clear. To show optimality, let Y be any feasible
solution for problem (E.2). Then for each s P SzA, Y psq ď X psq. Therefore, since ue is increasing,
we have ue
`
W e0 `H´X psq`Y psq
˘
ď ue
`
W e0 `H´X psq`X psq
˘
“ ue
`
W e0 `H
˘
, for each s P SzA.
Thus, ż
SzA
ue
`
W e0 `H ´X ` Y
˘
dP ď
ż
SzA
ue
`
W e0 `H ´X `X
˘
dP “ u
`
W e0 `H
˘
P pSzAq

Remark E.6. Since Q pSzAq “ 0 and T p0q “ 0, it follows that T ˝Q pSzAq “ 0, and so
ş
1SzA dT ˝Q “
T ˝Q pSzAq “ 0, by Proposition B.6. Therefore, for any Z P B` pΣq, it follows form the monotonicity
and positive homogeneity of the Choquet integral (Proposition B.6) that
0 ď
ż
SzA
Z dT ˝Q “
ż
Z1SzA dT ˝Q ď
ż
}Z}s1SzA dT ˝Q “ }Z}s
ż
1SzA dT ˝Q “ 0
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and so
ş
SzAZ dT ˝Q “ 0. Consequently, it follows form Proposition B.6 that for any Z P B
` pΣq,ż
Z dT ˝Q ď
ż
Z1A dT ˝Q “
ż
A
Z dT ˝Q
Now, consider the following problem:
sup
βPΓ
#
F ˚A pβq : F
˚
A pβq is the supremum of problem (E.1), for a fixed β P Γ
+
(E.3)
Lemma E.7. Under Assumption 7.1, if β˚ is optimal for problem (E.3), and if Y ˚1 is optimal for
problem (E.1) with parameter β˚, then Y ˚ :“ Y ˚1 1A ` X1SzA is optimal for problem (4.1) (with
υ “ T ˝Q).
Proof. By the feasibility of Y ˚1 for problem (E.1) with parameter β
˚, we have 0 ď Y ˚1 ď X andş
pX ´ Y ˚1 q dT ˝ P “ β
˚. Therefore, 0 ď Y ˚ ď X, andż
pX ´ Y ˚q dT ˝Q “
ż “
pX ´ Y ˚1 q1A ` pX ´Xq1SzA
‰
dT ˝Q
“
ż
A
pX ´ Y ˚1 q dT ˝Q ě
ż
pX ´ Y ˚1 q dT ˝Q “ β
˚ ě p1` ρqH
where the inequality
ş
A
pX ´ Y ˚1 q dT ˝Q ě
ş
pX ´ Y ˚1 q dT ˝Q follows from the same argument as
in Remark E.6. Hence, Y ˚ is feasible for problem (4.1) (with υ “ T ˝ Q). To show optimality of
Y ˚ for problem (4.1) (with υ “ T ˝Q), let Y be any other feasible function for problem (4.1) (with
υ “ T ˝ Q), and define α by α “
ş `
X ´ Y
˘
dT ˝ Q. Then α ě p1` ρqH, and so Y is feasible for
problem (E.1) with parameter α, and α is feasible for problem (E.3). Hence
F ˚A pαq ě
ż
A
ue
`
W e0 `H ´X ` Y
˘
dP
Now, since β˚ is optimal for problem (E.3), it follows that F ˚A pβ
˚q ě F ˚A pαq. Moreover, Y is
feasible for problem (E.2) (since 0 ď Y ď X and so
ş
SzA
`
X ´ Y
˘
dT ˝Q “ 0 by Remark E.6). Thus,
F ˚A pβ
˚q ` ue
`
W e0 `H
˘
P pSzAq ě F ˚A pαq ` ue
`
W e0 `H
˘
P pSzAq
ě
ż
A
ue
`
W e0 `H ´X ` Y
˘
dP ` ue
`
W e0 `H
˘
P pSzAq
ě
ż
A
ue
`
W e0 `H ´X ` Y
˘
dP `
ż
SzA
ue
`
W e0 `H ´X ` Y
˘
dP
“
ż
ue
`
W e0 `H ´X ` Y
˘
dP
However, F ˚A pβ
˚q “
ş
A
ue
`
W e0 `H ´X ` Y
˚
1
˘
dP . Therefore,ż
ue
`
W e0 `H ´X ` Y
˚
˘
dP “ F ˚A pβ
˚q ` ue
`
W e0 `H
˘
P pSzAq ě
ż
ue
`
W e0 `H ´X ` Y
˘
dP
Hence, Y ˚ is optimal for problem (4.1) (with υ “ T ˝Q). 
Remark E.8. By Lemma E.7, we can restrict ourselves to solving problem (E.1) with a parameter
β P Γ.
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E.2. Solving Problem (E.1). Recall that for all Z P B pΣq,
ş
Z dP “
ş
A
Zh dQ`
ş
SzA Z dP , where
h “ dPac{dQ is the Radon-Nikody´m derivative of Pac with respect to Q. Moreover, by definition of
the set A P Σ, we have Q pSzAq “ Ps pAq “ 0. Therefore,
ş
A
Zh dQ “
ş
Zh dQ, for each Z P B pΣq.
Hence, we can rewrite problem (E.1) (restricting ourselves to parameters β P Γ and recalling that
h “ φ ˝X) as the following problem:
For a given β P Γ,
sup
Y PBpΣq
ż
ue
`
W e0 `H ´X ` Y
˘
φ pXq dQ(E.4)
s.t. 0 ď Y ď Xż
pX ´ Y q dT ˝Q “ β
Now, consider the following problem:
For a given β P Γ,
sup
Y PBpΣq
ż
ue
`
W e0 `H ´ Z
˘
φ pXq dQ(E.5)
s.t. 0 ď Z ď Xż
Z dT ˝Q “ β “
ż `8
0
T
´
Q
`
ts P S : Z psq ě tu
˘¯
dt
Lemma E.9. If Z˚ is optimal for problem (E.5) with parameter β, then Y ˚ :“ X ´ Z˚ is optimal
for problem (E.4) with parameter β.
Proof. Let β P Γ be given, and suppose that Z˚ is optimal for problem (E.5) with parameter β.
Define Y ˚ :“ X ´ Z˚. Then Y ˚ P B pΣq. Moreover, since 0 ď Z˚ ď X, it follows that 0 ď Y ˚ ď X.
Now, ż
pX ´ Y ˚q dT ˝Q “
ż ´
X ´ pX ´ Z˚q
¯
dT ˝Q “
ż
Z˚ dT ˝Q “ β
and so Y ˚ is feasible for problem (E.4) with parameter β. To show optimality of Y ˚ for problem
(E.4) with parameter β, suppose, by way of contradiction, that Y ‰ Y ˚ is feasible for problem (E.4)
with parameter β andż
ue
`
W e0 `H ´X ` Y
˘
h dQ ą
ż
ue
`
W e0 `H ´X ` Y
˚
˘
h dQ
that is, with Z :“ X ´ Y , we haveż
ue
`
W e0 `H ´ Z
˘
h dQ ą
ż
ue
`
W e0 `H ´ Z
˚
˘
h dQ
Now, since 0 ď Y ď X and
ş `
X ´ Y
˘
dT ˝Q “ β, we have that Z is feasible for problem (E.5) with
parameter β, hence contradicting the optimality of Z˚ for problem (E.5) with parameter β. Thus,
Y ˚ :“ X ´ Z˚ is optimal for problem (E.4) with parameter β. 
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Definition E.10. If Z1, Z2 P B
` pΣq are feasible for problem (E.5) with parameter β, we will say
that Z2 is a Pareto improvement of Z1 (or is Pareto-improving) when the following hold:
(1)
ş
ue
`
W e0 `H ´ Z2
˘
h dQ ě
ş
ue
`
W e0 `H ´ Z1
˘
h dQ; and,
(2)
ş
Z2 dT ˝Q ě
ş
Z1 dT ˝Q.
The next result shows that for any feasible claim for problem (E.5), there is a another feasible
claim for problem (E.5), which is comonotonic with X and Pareto-improving.
Lemma E.11. Fix a parameter β P Γ. If Z is feasible for problem (E.5) with parameter β, then rZ
is feasible for problem (E.5) with parameter β, comonotonic with X and Pareto-improving, where rZ
is the nondecreasing Q-rearrangemproblement of Z with respect to X.
Proof. Let Z be feasible for problem (E.5) with parameter β, and note that by Assumption 7.4,
the map ξ pX,Zq :“ ue
`
W e0 ` H ´ Z
˘
φ pXq is supermodular (see Example B.10). Let rZ denote
the nondecreasing Q-rearrangement of Z with respect to X. Then by Lemma B.11 (2) and by
equimeasurability of Z and rZ, the function rZ is feasible for problem (E.5) with parameter β. Also,
by Lemma B.11 (1) and by supermodularity of ξ pX,Zq, it follows that rZ is Pareto-improving. 
E.3. Quantile reformulation. Fix a parameter β P Γ, let Z P B` pΣq be feasible for problem (E.5)
with parameter β, let FZ ptq “ Q
`
ts P S : Z psq ď tu
˘
denote the distribution function of Z with
respect to the probability measure Q and let FX ptq “ Q
`
ts P S : X psq ď tu
˘
denote the distribution
function of X with respect to the probability measure Q. Let F´1Z ptq be the left-continuous inverse
of the distribution function FZ (that is, the quantile function of Z), defined by
F´1Z ptq “ inf
!
z P R` : FZ pzq ě t
)
, @t P r0, 1s
Let rZ denote the nondecreasing Q-rearrangement of Z with respect to X. Since Z P B` pΣq, it can
be written as ψ˝X for some nonnegative Borel-measurable and bounded map ψ on X pSq. Moreover,
since 0 ď Z ď X, ψ is a mapping of r0,M s into r0,M s. Let ζ :“ Q ˝X´1 be the image measure of Q
under X. By Assumption 7.1, ζ is nonatomic. We can then define the mapping rψ : r0,M s Ñ r0,M s
as in Appendix B.2 (see equation (B.1) on p. 21) to be the nondecreasing ζ-rearrangement of ψ, that
is, rψ ptq :“ inf !z P R` : ζ`tx P r0,M s : ψ pxq ď zu˘ ě ζ` r0, ts ˘)
Then, as in Appendix B.2, rZ “ rψ ˝X. Therefore, for each s0 P S,rZ ps0q “ rψ pX ps0qq “ inf !z P R` : ζ`tx P r0,M s : ψ pxq ď zu˘ ě ζ` r0,X ps0qs ˘)
However, for each s0 P S,
ζ
`
r0,X ps0qs
˘
“ Q ˝X´1
`
r0,X ps0qs
˘
“ FX pX ps0qq :“ FX pXq ps0q
Moreover,
ζ
`
tx P r0,M s : ψ pxq ď zu
˘
“ Q ˝X´1
`
tx P r0,M s : ψ pxq ď zu
˘
“ Q
`
ts P S : ψ pX psqq ď zu
˘
“ FZ pzq
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Consequently, for each s0 P S,
rZ ps0q “ inf !z P R` : FZ pzq ě FX pXq ps0q) “ F´1Z pFX pX ps0qqq :“ F´1Z pFX pXqq ps0q
That is,
(E.6) rZ “ F´1Z pFX pXqq
where F´1Z is the left-continuous inverse of FZ , as defined in equation (7.1).
Hence, by Lemma E.11 and equation (E.6), we can restrict ourselves to finding a solution to
problem (E.5) of the form F´1 pFX pXqq, where F is the distribution function of a function Z P B
` pΣq
such that 0 ď Z ď X and
ş
Z dT ˝Q “ β. Moreover, since X is a nondecreasing function of X and
Q-equimeasurable with X, it follows from the Q-a.s. uniqueness of the equimeasurable nondecreasing
Q-rearrangement (see Appendix B.2) that X “ F´1X pFX pXqq, Q-a.s. (see also [20, Lemma A.21]).
Thus, for any Z P B` pΣq,ż
ue
`
W e0 `H ´ F
´1
Z pFX pXqq
˘
φ
`
F´1X pFX pXqq
˘
dQ “
ż
ue
`
W e0 `H ´ rZ˘ φ pXq dQ
ě
ż
ue
`
W e0 `H ´ Z
˘
φ pXq dQ
where the inequality follows from the proof of Lemma E.11. Moreover, since ζ “ Q˝X´1 is nonatomic
(by Assumption 7.1), it follows that FX pXq has a uniform distribution over p0, 1q [20, Lemma A.21],
that is, Q
`
ts P S : FX pXq psq ď tu
˘
“ t for each t P p0, 1q. Finally, letting U :“ FX pXq,ż
F´1 pUq dT ˝Q “
ż `8
0
T
”
Q
`
ts P S : F´1 pUq psq ě tu
˘ı
dt
“
ż `8
0
T
”
Q
`
ts P S : F´1 pUq psq ą tu
˘ı
dt
“
ż `8
0
T
”
1´ F ptq
ı
dt
“
ż 1
0
T 1 p1´ tqF´1 ptq dt “
ż
T 1 p1´ UqF´1 pUq dQ
where the third and last equalities above follow from the fact that U has a uniform distribution over
p0, 1q, and where the second-to-last equality follows from a standard argument7.
Now, recall from Definition 7.3 that AQuant given in equation (7.2) is the collection of all ad-
missible quantile functions, that is the collection of all functions f of the form F´1, where F is the
distribution function of a function Z P B` pΣq such that 0 ď Z ď X, and consider the following
problem:
7See, e.g. Denneberg [17], Proposition 1.4 on p. 8 and the discussion on pp. 61-62. See also [31, p. 418], [27, p. 210,
p. 213], or [8, p. 207].
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For a given β P Γ
sup
f
V pfq “
ż
ue
`
W e0 `H ´ f pUq
˘
φ
`
F´1X pUq
˘
dQ(E.7)
s.t. f P AQuantż
T 1 p1´ Uq f pUq dQ “ β
Lemma E.12. If f˚ is optimal for problem (E.7) with parameter β P Γ, then the function f˚ pUq is
optimal for problem (E.5) with parameter β, where U :“ FX pXq. Moreover, X ´ f
˚ pUq is optimal
for problem (E.4) with parameter β.
Proof. Fix β P Γ, suppose that f˚ P AQuant is optimal for problem (E.7) with parameter β and let
Z˚ P B` pΣq be a corresponding function. That is, f˚ is the quantile function of Z˚ and 0 ď Z˚ ď X.
Let rZ˚ :“ f˚ pUq. Then rZ˚ is the equimeasurable nondecreasing Q-rearrangement of Z˚ with respect
to X, and so 0 ď rZ˚ ď X by Lemma B.11 (2). Moreover,
β “
ż
T 1 p1´ Uq f˚ pUq dQ “
ż
f˚ pUq dT ˝Q
“
ż rZ˚ dT ˝Q “ ż `8
0
T
”
Q
`
ts P S : rZ˚ psq ě tu˘ı dt
“
ż `8
0
T
”
Q
`
ts P S : Z˚ psq ě tu
˘ı
dt “
ż rZ˚ dT ˝Q
where the second-to-last equality follows from the Q-equimeasurability of Z˚ and rZ˚. Therefore,rZ˚ “ f˚ pUq is feasible for problem (E.5) with parameter β. To show optimality, let Z be any
feasible solution for problem (E.5) with parameter β and let F be the distribution function for Z.
Then, by Lemma E.11, the function rZ :“ F´1 pUq is feasible for problem (E.5) with parameter β,
comonotonic with X and Pareto-improving. Moreover, rZ has also F as a distribution function. To
show optimality of rZ˚ “ f˚ pUq for problem (E.5) with parameter β it remains to show thatż
ue
`
W e0 `H ´
rZ˚˘ φ pXq dQ ě ż ue`W e0 `H ´ rZ˘ φ pXq dQ
Now, let f :“ F´1, so that rZ “ f pUq. Since rZ is feasible for problem (E.5) with parameter β, we
have
β “
ż rZ dT ˝Q “ ż F´1 pUq dT ˝Q
“
ż 1
0
T 1 p1´ tqF´1 ptq dt “
ż
T 1 p1´ Uq f pUq dQ
Hence, f is feasible for problem (E.7) with parameter β. Since f˚ is optimal for problem (E.7) with
parameter β we haveż
ue
`
W e0 `H ´ f
˚ pUq
˘
φ
`
F´1X pUq
˘
dQ ě
ż
ue
`
W e0 `H ´ f pUq
˘
φ
`
F´1X pUq
˘
dQ
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Finally, since X “ F´1X pUq , Q-a.s., we haveż
ue
`
W e0 `H ´ rZ˚˘ φ pXq dQ ě ż ue`W e0 `H ´ rZ˘ φ pXq dQ
Therefore, rZ˚ “ f˚ pUq is optimal for problem (E.5) with parameter β. Finally, by Lemma E.9,
Y ˚ :“ X ´ rZ˚ “ X ´ f˚ pUq is optimal for problem (E.4) with parameter β. 
By Lemmata E.7 and E.12, this completes the proof of Theorem 7.5. l
Appendix F. Proof of Corollary 7.8
Corollary F.1. Under the assumptions of Section 7, there exists a parameter β˚ ě p1` ρqH such
that an optimal solution Y ˚ for problem (4.1) (with υ “ T ˝Q) takes the following form:
Y ˚ “
˜
X ´max
«
0,min
!
F´1X pUq , f
˚
λ˚ pUq
)ﬀ¸
1A `X1SzA
where for each t P p0, 1q ztt : φ ˝ F´1x ptq “ 0u,
f˚λ˚ ptq “W
e
0 `H ´
`
u1e
˘´1˜´λ˚T 1 p1´ tq
φ
`
F´1X ptq
˘ ¸
and λ˚ is chosen so thatż 1
0
T 1 p1´ tqmax
”
0,min
!
F´1X ptq , f
˚
λ˚ ptq
)ı
dt “ β˚
Proof. Recall from equation (7.2) that
AQuant “
!
f P Quant : 0 ď f pzq ď F´1X pzq , for each 0 ă z ă 1
)
,
where Quant “
!
f : p0, 1q Ñ R
ˇˇˇ
f is nondecreasing and left-continuous
)
. Define the collection K of
functions on p0, 1q as follows:
(F.1) K “
!
f : p0, 1q Ñ R
ˇˇˇ
0 ď f pzq ď F´1X pzq , for each 0 ă z ă 1
)
Then AQuant “ QuantXK. Consider the following problem, with parameter β P Γ:
For a given β P Γ
sup
f
V pfq “
ż 1
0
ue
`
W e0 `H ´ f ptq
˘
φ
`
F´1X ptq
˘
dt(F.2)
s.t. f P AQuantż 1
0
T 1 p1´ tq f ptq dt “ β
Lemma F.2. For a given β P Γ, if f˚ P AQuant satisfies the following:
(1)
ş1
0
T 1 p1´ tq f˚ ptq dt “ β;
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(2) There exists λ ď 0 such that for all t P p0, 1q ztt : φ ˝ F´1x ptq “ 0u,
f˚ ptq “ argmax
0ďyďF´1
X
ptq
“
ue pW
e
0 `H ´ yqφ
`
F´1X ptq
˘
´ λT 1 p1´ tq y
‰
Then f˚ solves problem (F.2) with parameter β
Proof. Fix β P Γ, suppose that f˚ P AQuant satisfies conditions p1q and p2q above. Then, in
particular, f˚ is feasible for problem (F.2) with parameter β. To show optimality of f˚ for problem
(F.2) with parameter β, let f by any other feasible solution for problem (F.2) with parameter β.
Then, for all t P p0, 1q ztt : φ ˝ F´1x ptq “ 0u,
ue pW
e
0 `H ´ f
˚ ptqq φ
`
F´1X ptq
˘
´ λT 1 p1´ tq f˚ ptq
ě ue pW
e
0 `H ´ f ptqqφ
`
F´1X ptq
˘
´ λT 1 p1´ tq f ptq
That is,
”
ue pW
e
0 `H ´ f
˚ ptqq ´ ue pW
e
0 `H ´ f ptqq
ı
φ
`
F´1X ptq
˘
ě λT 1 p1´ tq
”
f˚ ptq ´ f ptq
ı
. In-
tegrating yields V pf˚q ´ V pfq ě λ rβ ´ βs “ 0, that is V pf˚q ě V pfq, as required. 
Hence, in view of Lemma F.2, in order to find a solution for problem (F.2) with a given parameter
β P Γ and a given λ ď 0, one can start by solving the problem
(F.3) max
0ďfλptqďF
´1
X
ptq
“
ue pW
e
0 `H ´ fλ ptqqφ
`
F´1X ptq
˘
´ λT 1 p1´ tq fλ ptq
‰
for a fixed t P p0, 1q ztt : φ ˝ F´1x ptq “ 0u.
Consider first the following problem:
(F.4) max
fλptq
“
ue pW
e
0 `H ´ fλ ptqqφ
`
F´1X ptq
˘
´ λT 1 p1´ tq fλ ptq
‰
for a fixed t P p0, 1q ztt : φ ˝ F´1x ptq “ 0u.
By concavity of the utility function u, in order to solve problem (F.4), it suffices to solve for the
first-order condition
´u1e pW
e
0 `H ´ f
˚
λ ptqqφ
`
F´1X ptq
˘
´ λT 1 p1´ tq “ 0
which gives
(F.5) f˚λ ptq “W
e
0 `H ´
`
u1e
˘´1˜´λT 1 p1´ tq
φ
`
F´1X ptq
˘ ¸
Then the function f˚λ ptq solve problem (F.4), for a fixed t P p0, 1q ztt : φ ˝ F
´1
x ptq “ 0u.
By Assumption 7.7, the function t ÞÑ T
1p1´tq
φpF´1X ptqq
is nondecreasing. By Assumption 4.5 , the function
ue is strictly concave and continuously differentiable. Hence, the function u
1
e is both continuous and
strictly decreasing. This then implies that pu1eq
´1 is continuous and strictly decreasing, by the Inverse
Function Theorem [50, pp. 221-223]. Therefore, the function f˚λ ptq in equation (F.5) is nondecreasing
(λ ď 0). Moreover, by Assumption 7.1 and Assumption 7.6, f˚λ ptq is left-continuous.
Define the function f˚˚λ by
(F.6) f˚˚λ ptq “ max
«
0,min
!
F´1X ptq , f
˚
λ ptq
)ﬀ
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Then f˚˚λ ptq P K. Moreover, since both F
´1
X and f
˚
λ are nondecreasing and left-continuous functions,
it follows that f˚˚λ is nondecreasing and left-continuous. Consequently, f
˚˚
λ ptq P AQuant. Finally,
it is easily seen that f˚˚λ ptq solves problem (F.3) for the given λ. Now, for a given β0 P Γ, if λ
˚ is
chosen so that
ş1
0
T 1 p1´ tq f˚˚λ˚ ptq dt “ β0, then by Lemma F.2, f
˚˚
λ˚ is optimal for problem (F.2)
with parameter β0.
Hence, in view of Theorem 7.5, to conclude the proof of Corollary 7.8, it remains to show that for
each β0 P Γ, there exists a λ
˚ ď 0 such that
ş1
0
T 1 p1´ tq f˚˚λ˚ ptq dt “ β0. This is given by Lemma
F.3 below.
Lemma F.3. Let ψ be the function of the parameter λ ď 0 defined by ψ pλq :“
ş1
0
T 1 p1´ tq f˚˚λ ptq dt.
Then for each β0 P Γ, there exists a λ
˚ ď 0 such that ψ pλ˚q “ β0.
Proof. First note that ψ is a continuous and nonincreasing function of λ, where continuity of ψ is a
consequence of Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence Theorem [1, Theorem 11.21]. Indeed, since X is
bounded and since F´1X is nondecreasing, it follows that for each t P r0, 1s,
min
!
F´1X ptq , f
˚
λ ptq
)
ď F´1X ptq ď F
´1
X p1q ďM “ }X}s ă `8.
Moreover, since T is concave and increasing, T 1 is nonincreasing and nonnegative, and so for each
t P r0, 1s, 0 ď T 1 p1´ tq ď T 1 p0q. But T 1 p0q ă `8, by Assumption 7.1. Hence, for each t P r0, 1s,
min
!
F´1X ptq , f
˚
λ ptq
)
T 1 p1´ tq ď F´1X p1qT
1 p0q ď }X}s T
1 p0q ă `8
Moreover, ψ p0q “ 0 (by Assumption 4.5), and
lim
λÑ´8
ψ pλq “
ż 1
0
T 1 p1´ tqmin
!
F´1X ptq ,W
e
0 `H
)
dt
“
ż FXpW e0`Hq
0
T 1 p1´ tqF´1X ptq dt` pW
e
0 `Hq
ż 1
FXpW e0`Hq
T 1 p1´ tq dt
However, by Assumption 7.2, we have FX pW
e
0 `Hq “ 1. This then implies that
lim
λÑ´8
ψ pλq “
ż 1
0
T 1 p1´ tqF´1X ptq dt “
ż
X dT ˝Q
Now, for any β0 P Γ, and for any Y P B
` pΣq which is feasible for problem (E.1) with parameter
β0, one has:
(i) 0 ď Y ď X; and,
(ii)
ş
pX ´ Y q dT ˝Q “ β0.
Hence, 0 ď X´Y ď X, and so, by monotonicity of the Choquet integral (Proposition B.6), it follows
that β0 “
ş
pX ´ Y q dT ˝Q ď
ş
X dT ˝Q. Consequently, for any β0 P Γ,
0 “ ψ p0q ď β0 ď
ż
X dT ˝Q “ lim
λÑ´8
ψ pλq
Hence, by the Intermediate Value Theorem [50, Theorem 4.23], for each β0 P Γ there exists some
λ˚ ď 0 such that ψ pλ˚q “ β0. 
By Lemmata F.2 and F.3, this concludes the proof of Corollary F.1. 
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Now, since the function f˚˚λ ptq “ max
«
0,min
!
F´1X ptq , f
˚
λ˚ ptq
)ﬀ
is optimal for problem (F.2)
with parameter β˚, it is optimal for problem (E.7) with parameter β˚. Therefore, by Lemma E.12,
the function
f˚˚λ pUq “ max
«
0,min
!
F´1X pUq , f
˚
λ˚ pUq
)ﬀ
is optimal for problem (E.5) with parameter β˚. However, since Q˝X´1 is nonatomic (by Assumption
7.1), it follows that FX pXq has a uniform distribution over p0, 1q [20, Lemma A.21], and that X “
F´1X pFX pXqq , Q-a.s. Therefore,
f˚˚λ pUq “ max
«
0,min
!
F´1X pUq , f
˚
λ˚ pUq
)ﬀ
“ max
«
0,min
!
F´1X pUq ,W
e
0 `H ´
`
u1e
˘´1˜´λ˚T 1 p1´ Uq
φ
`
F´1X pUq
˘ ¸)ﬀ
“ max
«
0,min
#
X,W e0 `H ´
`
u1e
˘´1ˆ´λ˚T 1 p1´ Uq
φ pXq
˙+ﬀ
, Q-a.s.
This Q-a.s. equality implies that
max
«
0,min
#
X,W e0 `H ´
`
u1e
˘´1ˆ´λ˚T 1 p1´ Uq
φ pXq
˙+ﬀ
is also optimal for problem (E.5) with parameter β˚. Lemma E.9 then implies that
X ´max
«
0,min
#
X,W e0 `H ´
`
u1e
˘´1ˆ´λ˚T 1 p1´ Uq
φ pXq
˙+ﬀ
is optimal for problem (E.4) (and hence for problem (E.1)) with parameter β˚. Finally, it can easily
be verified that
X´max
«
0,min
#
X,W e0 `H ´
`
u1e
˘´1ˆ´λ˚T 1 p1´ Uq
φ pXq
˙+ﬀ
“ min
«
X,max
˜
0,X ´
„
W e0 `H ´
`
u1e
˘´1ˆ´λ˚T 1 p1´ Uq
φ pXq
˙¸ﬀ
The rest follows form Lemma E.7 and Corollary F.1, noting that since X “ F´1X pUq , Q-a.s., one
has:
β˚ “
ż 1
0
T 1 p1´ tqmax
”
0,min
!
F´1X ptq , f
˚
λ˚ ptq
)ı
dt
“
ż
T 1 p1´ Uqmax
”
0,min
!
F´1X pUq , f
˚
λ˚ pUq
)ı
dQ
“
ż
T 1 p1´ Uqmax
«
0,min
#
X,W e0 `H ´
`
u1e
˘´1ˆ´λ˚T 1 p1´ Uq
φ pXq
˙+ﬀ
dQ
This concludes the proof of Corollary 7.8. l
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